Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei born 19 April 1939 in Mashhad, Iran; died 28 February 2026 in Tehran was the second and longest-serving Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He held that office for thirty-six and a half years, from June 1989 until his assassination in a joint United States-Israeli airstrike on 28 February 2026. A senior Shia cleric, politician, and the paramount authority over every branch of the Iranian state, Khamenei shaped the modern Middle East in ways few individuals of his era can match. His death has triggered an immediate succession crisis, a spiralling regional conflict, and profound uncertainty about the future of the Islamic Republic itself.

This article provides a comprehensive account of Khamenei’s life from his early years as a revolutionary cleric in Mashhad, through his presidency during the Iran-Iraq War, to his three and a half decades as Iran’s Rahbar (supreme leader) and a detailed analysis of the circumstances and consequences of his death.

Key Facts at a Glance

Full Name	Ali Hosseini Khamenei
Born	19 April 1939, Mashhad, Iran
Died	28 February 2026, Tehran, Iran (assassinated)
Cause of Death	Airstrike joint US–Israeli operation (Operation Roaring Lion / Operation Epic Fury)
Title	Supreme Leader of Iran (Rahbar); Ayatollah; Sayyid
In Office	4 June 1989 – 28 February 2026 (36 years, 269 days)
Predecessor	Ruhollah Khomeini
Also Served As	President of Iran, 1981–1989
Survived By	Sons Mostafa and Masoud; son Mojtaba (also a potential successor candidate)

Early Life and Path to the Revolution

Birth and Education in Mashhad

Ali Hosseini Khamenei was born on 19 April 1939 in Mashhad, the holy city in north-eastern Iran that houses the shrine of Imam Reza, the eighth Shia imam. He was born into a family of modest clerical background; his father, Javad Hosseini Khamenei, was an Azerbaijani Shia cleric, while his mother was of Persian descent. As one of eight children, he grew up in relative poverty. He later recalled that as a child, the family sometimes could not afford kerosene to heat their home.

He began his religious education known as hawza studies in Mashhad under local scholars. In 1958, at the age of nineteen, he travelled to the holy city of Qom, the pre-eminent centre of Shia Islamic scholarship in Iran. There, he enrolled in the advanced religious seminary and, crucially, began attending the lectures of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a mid-ranking cleric who was beginning to emerge as a fierce critic of the Shah’s rule. That encounter between student and teacher would define the course of Iranian history.

Exile, Arrest, and Opposition to the Shah

Through the 1960s and 1970s, Khamenei became increasingly enmeshed in the underground opposition movement against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. He was arrested six times by SAVAK, the Shah’s feared secret police, and endured periods of imprisonment and internal exile. He was held in the harsh Evin prison and at Dezful and Birjand, among other locations. His time in detention, far from breaking him, deepened his revolutionary conviction.

He also spent time studying in Najaf, Iraq another major centre of Shia scholarship where he continued to absorb Khomeini’s doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), the concept that Shia clerics have both the right and the duty to govern Islamic society in the absence of the Hidden Imam. This framework would later become the constitutional bedrock of the Islamic Republic.

Role in the 1979 Iranian Revolution

By the late 1970s, Khamenei was a recognised figure in Khomeini’s inner circle, responsible for liaising between the exiled leader and revolutionary networks inside Iran. When mass protests brought the Shah’s regime to its knees in 1978 and 1979, Khamenei was among the key organisers. After Khomeini returned triumphantly to Tehran on 1 February 1979, Khamenei was appointed to the Revolutionary Council, the body that effectively governed Iran in the chaotic transition period. He was among those who took over the state broadcasting organisation, secured the loyalty of key military units, and helped draft the foundational institutions of the new Islamic Republic.

Rise to Power: From Cleric to President to Supreme Leader

The 1981 Assassination Attempt: A Defining Moment

On 27 June 1981, a bomb hidden inside a tape recorder exploded during a speech Khamenei was delivering at the Abu Dhar Mosque in Tehran. The explosion was carried out by the Mojahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), a group that had turned violently against the Islamic Republic. The blast severely damaged his vocal cords, collapsed one of his lungs, and permanently paralysed his right arm. He was thirty-two years old. That he survived at all was considered remarkable; the injuries he sustained left him speaking in a distinctive, slightly strained voice for the rest of his life, and he was never again able to use his right hand.

The attempt on his life occurred at one of the most violent moments of the Islamic Republic’s early existence the same summer in which both President Mohammad-Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad-Javad Bahonar were killed in a separate bombing. Khamenei’s survival, and his rapid return to public life, cemented his standing as a battle-hardened loyalist of the revolution.

Presidency During the Iran-Iraq War (1981–1989)

Khamenei was elected President of Iran in October 1981, a position he held until 1989. His two terms coincided almost entirely with the devastating Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), in which Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces, with covert Western support, attacked Iran. Khamenei served as a key link between the civilian government and the military, visiting the front lines and working closely with the newly established Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). His relationship with the IRGC during this period was foundational; the Guards’ commanders would remain his most important constituency for the rest of his life.

As president, Khamenei clashed repeatedly with Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi whom he regarded as too interventionist in the economy and was constrained by Khomeini himself, who sided with Mousavi on economic policy. These years taught Khamenei a lesson he would not forget: the presidency was not the apex of power. Influence lay with the Supreme Leader.

Succession After Khomeini (1989): An Unlikely Heir

When Khomeini died on 3 June 1989, the Islamic Republic faced its first existential test. The obvious successor, Grand Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, had been sidelined months earlier after publicly criticising the mass executions of political prisoners and the regime’s direction. The Assembly of Experts, tasked with selecting a new Supreme Leader under the constitution, faced an awkward problem: no remaining candidate had the requisite rank of Grand Ayatollah and the political loyalty the moment demanded.

Khamenei still a mid-level cleric of the rank of Hojatoleslam was chosen. To make this constitutionally workable, the Assembly voted to retroactively elevate his clerical rank and, crucially, the constitution was simultaneously amended to remove the requirement that the Supreme Leader hold the Grand Ayatollah rank. His selection was widely seen within Iran’s senior clergy as politically expedient rather than religiously legitimate. As Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group later observed, Khamenei himself understood this vulnerability intimately: he spent the next three decades systematically building the institutional power that would compensate for his lack of religious prestige.

The Khamenei Era: Domestic and Foreign Policy (1989–2026)

Consolidating Power: The Architecture of Supreme Authority

In the years following his accession, Khamenei moved methodically to concentrate power in the office of the Supreme Leader. He marginalised competing centres of authority including reformist presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami through a combination of constitutional manoeuvre, control of the judiciary and Guardian Council, and sustained cultivation of the IRGC as his personal enforcement arm.

The IRGC’s commercial empire spanning construction, oil, telecommunications, and finance expanded dramatically under Khamenei, creating a military-economic complex with strong incentives to preserve his rule. By the 2010s, the Guards controlled an estimated 20–40 per cent of Iran’s formal economy. In exchange, they provided Khamenei with an instrument of both domestic repression and regional power projection that no other Iranian leader had ever possessed.

Major Protests and Crackdowns

Khamenei’s rule was defined by a recurring cycle of popular protest and violent suppression. The 1999 student uprisings, sparked by the closure of a reformist newspaper, were met with attacks on dormitories by Basij paramilitaries. The 2009 Green Movement the largest protests since the revolution erupted after Khamenei intervened to secure victory for his preferred candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a widely condemned election; the subsequent crackdown left dozens dead and thousands imprisoned.

In September 2022, the death in custody of Mahsa Amini a 22-year-old Kurdish Iranian woman arrested by morality police for allegedly wearing her hijab improperly ignited the ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ uprising, the most geographically widespread and politically radical protests of the Islamic Republic’s existence. The movement targeted not individual policies but the system itself, with protesters chanting directly against Khamenei. The regime’s response was characterised by mass arrests, internet shutdowns, live fire against demonstrators, and execution of those convicted of protest-related charges. By Khamenei’s own admission, in January 2026, several thousand people had died in the unrest.

Economic Policy and the ‘Energy Superpower’

Khamenei favoured economic privatisation of state-owned industries in principle, and Iran’s vast oil and gas reserves second only to Russia in natural gas, fourth in oil gave him the platform to pursue an ‘energy superpower’ vision. In practice, however, the privatisation process largely transferred assets from the state to IRGC-linked holding companies rather than to an independent private sector. Western sanctions tightened dramatically after Iran’s nuclear escalations progressively isolated Iran from global finance and technology. By the time of his death, Iran’s economy had been severely weakened: the rial had lost most of its value, youth unemployment was chronically high, and middle-class emigration had become a mass phenomenon.

Foreign Policy: Architect of the ‘Axis of Resistance’

If Khamenei’s domestic record was defined by repression and economic mismanagement, his foreign policy legacy is arguably more consequential for the wider region. He was the principal architect of the ‘Axis of Resistance’ a coalition of state and non-state actors aligned with Iran against the United States and Israel. Under his direction, Iran provided financial, military, and intelligence support to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. He also supplied Russia with drones for use in the Ukraine war.

Khamenei’s strategic logic, as articulated by analysts such as Ali Vaez, was one of ‘forward defence’: rather than waiting for an adversary to reach Iran’s borders, project power outward through proxies so that any conflict occurs far from home. For decades, the strategy appeared to work. The setbacks of 2023–2025 the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, the subsequent Israeli campaign that decimated Hamas and Hezbollah leadership, and the Twelve-Day War between Iran and Israel in June 2025 shattered the deterrence architecture Khamenei had spent three decades building.

The Nuclear Programme

The Iranian nuclear programme was perhaps the single most consequential foreign policy issue of Khamenei’s tenure. He personally held veto power over all nuclear decisions, and his public posture combined a religious fatwa purportedly prohibiting nuclear weapons with steadfast refusal to halt uranium enrichment. The programme became a tool of strategic leverage: advanced enough to threaten a nuclear breakout, but never quite crossing the line that would provoke a decisive pre-emptive attack at least until 2025. Operation Midnight Hammer in June 2025 targeted and severely damaged three major Iranian nuclear facilities, reportedly setting the programme back by approximately two years.

Khamenei’s attitude to the United States was one of deep, ideologically grounded hostility, consistently framing the relationship in terms of civilisational struggle. He rejected or sabotaged multiple opportunities for a diplomatic accommodation most notably by undermining President Rouhani’s diplomacy around the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and supporting President Trump’s framing after the US withdrew from the deal in 2018.

Antisemitism, Anti-Zionism, and the Conflict with Israel

Khamenei’s anti-Israel rhetoric was a consistent and central feature of his public persona. He called for the destruction of the Israeli state through referendum, denied the Holocaust in several speeches (though his foreign minister later said he had been mistranslated), and provided arms, training, and funding to every major Palestinian armed group. His rhetoric about Jews crossed into outright antisemitism, deploying conspiracy theories and what critics described as the language of medieval European anti-Jewish pogroms. Under his leadership, Iran hosted Holocaust-denial conferences and printed anti-Semitic cartoons in state media.

Death and Immediate Aftermath (February–March 2026)

The Assassination: 28 February 2026

On the morning of 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched a large-scale coordinated military operation known on the Israeli side as Operation Roaring Lion and on the American side as Operation Epic Fury against targets across Iran. The operation struck 24 of Iran’s 31 provinces, targeting nuclear facilities, missile production sites, air defence systems, and the command structures of the IRGC and the regular armed forces. In total, at least 201 people were killed across the country, according to the Iranian Red Crescent.

Among the targets was Khamenei’s official compound in Tehran. Satellite imagery published in the hours following the strikes showed severe damage to the building complex. An unnamed Israeli official stated that Khamenei’s body had been located and that documentation was shown to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In the immediate aftermath, Iranian officials including Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the Foreign Ministry spokesman insisted that Khamenei was ‘safe and sound’ and ‘steadfast and firm in commanding the field.’ Iranian news agencies Tasnim and Mehr maintained the denial for several hours.

Early on 1 March 2026, Iranian state broadcaster IRIB and the Supreme National Security Council officially confirmed that Khamenei had been killed in the strikes describing his death as ‘martyrdom.’ The government announced forty days of national mourning and a seven-day public holiday. The Fars News Agency, affiliated with the IRGC, reported that four members of Khamenei’s immediate family his daughter, son-in-law, grandchild, and daughter-in-law were also killed in the same strikes.

CONTEXT: The killing represents only the second time in less than a century that the United States has acted to remove an Iranian head of state. The first was the CIA-backed coup in 1953 that overthrew the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. That event and the decade of royal autocracy it enabled is the foundational grievance of the Islamic Republic’s anti-American narrative.

Other Senior Officials Killed in the Strike

The 28 February strikes decapitated significant portions of Iran’s military and security leadership. Among the confirmed dead:

• Mohammad Pakpour Commander-in-Chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the second time in less than twelve months that Israel had killed an IRGC commander-in-chief.
• Ali Shamkhani Khamenei’s top national security adviser and former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, described as one of his most trusted aides.
• Aziz Nasirzadeh Senior air force commander.
• Several other IRGC and regular military general officers, totalling approximately seven confirmed senior security figures, with reports suggesting up to thirty top commanders were targeted.

Civilian Reaction: Mourning and Celebration

The popular reaction within Iran was sharply divided and historically revealing. In cities with large populations of religious conservatives including around the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad crowds gathered in mourning, weeping in the streets and holding portraits of the late Supreme Leader. State media broadcast scenes of grief and organised funeral processions.

Simultaneously, in other parts of Tehran and in cities including Isfahan, Karaj, Kermanshah, Qazvin, Sanandaj, and Shiraz, witnesses reported cheers, celebratory music played from apartment windows, car horns, and street celebrations. Videos circulating on social media showed Iranian women dancing and removing their headscarves in public. The reaction offered a vivid snapshot of the deep social fracture that had grown under Khamenei’s rule particularly following the Mahsa Amini protests.

The Succession Crisis: Who Will Lead Iran?

The Constitutional Process

Under Article 111 of the Iranian Constitution, when the office of Supreme Leader falls vacant, a temporary leadership council immediately assumes state duties. That council consists of three members: the President, the head of the judiciary, and a jurist elected from among the members of the Guardian Council. They hold power until the Assembly of Experts an eighty-eight-member body of senior clerics elected by the public convenes to select a new permanent Supreme Leader.

On 1 March 2026, Iran announced the composition of the interim council: President Masoud Pezeshkian; Supreme Court Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei; and Ayatollah Alireza Arafi, a member of the Guardian Council appointed as the jurist representative. The council’s formation was confirmed by the Expediency Council.

Ali Larijani a former parliament speaker, ex-IRGC officer, and the most senior civilian official to have survived the strikes emerged in the hours after Khamenei’s death as the de facto co-ordinator of the regime’s response. He appeared in public on 1 March to declare that Iran’s transition was ‘underway’ and that the country would deliver an ‘unforgettable lesson’ to the United States and Israel. According to reports in The New York Times, Khamenei himself had, in anticipation of exactly this scenario, elevated Larijani to manage crisis succession in the event of a decapitation strike.

Potential Candidates for the New Supreme Leader

The Assembly of Experts has examined potential candidates in secrecy and without public announcement. Prior to his death, Khamenei had reportedly nominated three senior clerics as possible successors: Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei (now serving on the interim council), Asghar Hejazi, and Hassan Khomeini. The following table summarises the major candidates as assessed by analysts and reported by intelligence services:

Candidate	Background	Strengths	Challenges
Mojtaba Khamenei	Second son of the late Supreme Leader; influential in IRGC and Basij circles	IRGC loyalty; family continuity	Dynastic succession is deeply unpopular; lacks senior clerical rank; reportedly opposed by father himself
Alireza Arafi	Deputy chairman of Assembly of Experts; head of Iran’s seminary system; now on interim council	Institutional trust; named by father; tech-savvy and multilingual	Not a political heavyweight; limited security establishment ties
Hassan Khomeini	Grandson of Islamic Republic founder Ruhollah Khomeini	Immense symbolic and religious legitimacy	Seen as less hardline; barred from Assembly of Experts in 2016; outsider to power structures
Ali Larijani	Former parliament speaker; ex-IRGC; Secretary of Supreme National Security Council	Pragmatic; deep establishment ties; already governing in crisis	Not a senior cleric; secular profile may be disqualifying
Mohammad-Mahdi Mirbagheri	Hardline cleric; Assembly of Experts member	Ideological purity; conservative support	Extreme views risk further international isolation
Sadiq Larijani	Ali Larijani’s brother; former judiciary chief; senior cleric	Religious credentials; institutional experience	Seen as deeply corrupt by reform circles; widely unpopular

Analysts at the International Crisis Group, the Stimson Center, and the Middle East Institute broadly agree on three possible succession scenarios. First, a rapid consensus appointment of a single candidate who satisfies both the clerical establishment and the IRGC the most stabilising outcome. Second, a prolonged factional struggle within the Assembly of Experts, possibly producing a compromise council rather than a single leader. Third, an effective takeover by the IRGC, which would transform Iran into a security state with clerical legitimacy as a veneer a trajectory the CIA, in its pre-strike assessments, identified as the most probable outcome.

Global Repercussions: A Region on the Brink

Military Escalation

Iran’s retaliatory response was swift and multi-directional. In the hours following the strikes, Iranian ballistic missiles struck Tel Aviv, killing at least one person a woman in her forties who had been critically wounded and wounding dozens of others. Drone attacks were launched towards Bahrain, where the US Fifth Fleet is based, and against targets in the wider Gulf region. An oil tanker was reportedly attacked in the Gulf of Oman. The IRGC’s deputy chief Ahmad Vahidi, rapidly elevated following Pakpour’s death, signalled that further strikes would follow until Iran’s ‘unforgettable lesson’ had been delivered.

In Baghdad, Shia protesters attempted to storm the US embassy near the Green Zone, confronting Iraqi security forces and blocking roads. Iraqi Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr expressed public grief over Khamenei’s death. Pakistan’s Shia community staged protests in Lahore. The Lebanese border saw drone interceptions, and Hezbollah newly weakened from the previous year’s conflict announced mourning for the ‘martyr.’

International Reactions

Country / Entity	Reaction	Key Statement
United States (Trump)	Celebratory	Called Khamenei ‘one of the most evil people in History’; said his killing was ‘justice’; urged Iranians to rise up against the government
Israel (Netanyahu)	Celebratory	Said Khamenei’s killing would ‘make true peace possible’; confirmed strikes had decimated Iran’s chain of command
Argentina (Milei)	Strongly positive	Praised the ‘elimination’ of Khamenei; blamed him for the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires
Exiled Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi	Celebratory	Called Khamenei ‘the bloodthirsty Zahhak of our time’; urged security forces to join the people
Iraq (Al-Sadr)	Mourning	Expressed ‘sadness and sorrow’; condemned the strikes
Hezbollah (Lebanon)	Mourning	Declared mourning for the ‘martyr’; threatened retaliation
Pakistan (government)	Condemnation	Condemned the strikes; large Shia protests in Lahore
Iran (Pezeshkian)	Condemnation	Described Khamenei’s killing as a ‘great crime’; vowed it would not go unanswered

Impact on Travel and Global Economy

The strikes and subsequent Iranian retaliatory missile fire prompted immediate disruptions to international aviation and global energy markets. The UK Foreign Office issued an urgent travel advisory warning British nationals against all travel to Iran and to exercise heightened caution in the Gulf region. Several countries closed their airspace over Iran, leading to widespread flight cancellations and diversions across routes connecting Europe, Central Asia, and East Asia. Oil futures rose sharply on global markets in response to the escalation in the world’s most energy-sensitive region.

Personal Life and Public Persona

Khamenei was married to Mansoureh Khojasteh-Bagherzadeh and had six children: three sons Mojtaba, Mostafa, and Masoud and three daughters. Of these, Mojtaba was the most politically prominent, widely believed to have been a candidate for succession and a figure of significant influence within the IRGC and Basij. Mostafa and Masoud maintained lower public profiles. Three of Khamenei’s children his daughter, son-in-law, and a grandchild were killed alongside him in the 28 February strikes.

Despite his image as a hardline ideologue, Khamenei had a well-documented passion for literature, music, and poetry. He was an avid reader of Persian classical poetry, particularly Hafez and Rumi, wrote his own verse, and had translated books from Arabic into Persian. He was also reportedly fond of traditional Iranian music, a slightly incongruous interest given his government’s periodic crackdowns on public musical performance. His published memoirs and speeches revealed a man who saw himself in deeply historical terms as a guardian of civilisational Islam against Western cultural imperialism.

The Enduring Legacy of Ali Khamenei

How history will judge Ali Khamenei depends on who is doing the judging. For the Islamic Republic’s supporters, he was the Rahbar who preserved the revolution through four decades of existential pressure wars, sanctions, coups plots, and popular uprisings and who built Iran into a genuine regional power with a nuclear near-threshold capability, a continent-spanning network of proxies, and a seat at the tables of global geopolitics that no Iranian leader before or since has matched.

For his millions of domestic critics and for the many Iranians who celebrated in the streets as news of his death spread his legacy is one of systematic repression, economic ruin, and squandered national potential. He presided over the execution of political prisoners, the torture of journalists and activists, the killing of protesters, and the forced exile of much of Iran’s educated class. He chose ideological purity over national development and the interests of a clerical-military oligarchy over the wellbeing of ordinary Iranians.

On the regional and global stage, he is likely to be remembered as the man who built the ‘Axis of Resistance’ who kept the Palestinian cause militarily alive through Hamas and Hezbollah when it might otherwise have collapsed, who forced the United States into costly confrontations across the Middle East, and who brought Iran to the edge of the nuclear threshold. Whether that constitutes strategic genius or reckless brinkmanship that ultimately brought destruction upon his own people and his own family is a judgement that history has barely begun to form.

What is not in dispute is the scale of the disruption his death has produced. Khamenei was the Islamic Republic’s gravitational centre the figure around whom every other institution, faction, and power calculation orbited. His removal has not ended the Islamic Republic. But it has forced the question: can it survive the weight of what it has become?

Frequently Asked Questions

How did Ali Khamenei die?

Ali Khamenei was killed on 28 February 2026 in a joint airstrike by the United States and Israel. His compound in Tehran was struck during Operation Roaring Lion / Operation Epic Fury, a large-scale military operation targeting nuclear facilities, missile sites, and senior leadership. Iranian state media confirmed his death early on 1 March 2026.

Who is leading Iran now?

An interim three-member leadership council consisting of President Masoud Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and cleric Alireza Arafi is currently governing Iran under Article 111 of the constitution. The Assembly of Experts, an eighty-eight-member clerical body, is expected to convene to elect a permanent new Supreme Leader. No successor has been officially named as of 1 March 2026.

What is the Assembly of Experts?

The Assembly of Experts is an eighty-eight-member body of senior Islamic clerics elected by the Iranian public every eight years. Its principal constitutional functions are to select the Supreme Leader and to supervise his conduct in office. The Assembly’s current session began in 2024 and is scheduled to sit until 2032. In practice, candidates must first be approved by the Guardian Council itself partly appointed by the Supreme Leader making the selection process an internal regime affair.

Why was Khamenei assassinated?

The United States and Israel stated that the operation was intended to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, destroy its ballistic missile infrastructure, and initiate regime change. President Trump publicly called for the Iranian people to overthrow their government in the wake of the strikes. The operation came after years of escalating conflict, including the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 and sustained US-Israeli strikes on Iranian proxy forces.

What was Khamenei’s relationship with the United States like?

Khamenei regarded the United States as the ‘Great Satan’ the principal external enemy of the Islamic Republic and this view was not merely rhetorical but shaped every major foreign policy decision of his tenure. He presided over Iranian support for attacks on US forces in Iraq and Syria, the development of a missile programme capable of striking US bases across the Middle East, and a sustained effort to replace US influence in the region with Iranian-led alternatives.

Did Khamenei support Hamas and Hezbollah?

Yes. Support for Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon was a cornerstone of Khamenei’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ strategy. Iran provided both organisations with funding, weapons, training, and intelligence. Hezbollah, in particular, was widely described as Iran’s most capable proxy a state-within-a-state in Lebanon with a missile arsenal that, prior to its decimation in the 2024–2025 conflict, posed a significant strategic deterrent against Israel.

What were the major protests during Khamenei’s rule?

Major protests included: the 1999 student uprisings; the 2009 Green Movement, which erupted after a stolen presidential election; the 2017–18 economic protests; the 2019–20 protests over petrol price increases, during which the government shut down the internet and killed hundreds; the 2022 ‘Woman, Life, Freedom’ movement triggered by Mahsa Amini’s death in custody; and the 2025–26 protests that continued until weeks before his death. Khamenei personally acknowledged in January 2026 that several thousand people had died in the 2025–26 unrest alone.

How old was Khamenei when he died?

Ali Khamenei was eighty-six years old at the time of his death on 28 February 2026. He had been born on 19 April 1939 and would have turned eighty-seven in April 2026.

What did Donald Trump say about Khamenei’s death?

President Trump celebrated the killing on his Truth Social platform, calling Khamenei ‘one of the most evil people in History’ and describing his death as ‘justice’ for Americans and others killed by Iranian-backed forces over the decades. Trump appeared to confirm US involvement in the operation and called on the Iranian people to use the moment to ‘take back their country.’ He stated the strikes would continue ‘until peace is secured.’

Sources & Further Reading

This article draws on reporting from Al Jazeera, CNN, BBC News, NPR, Reuters, The Times of Israel, Axios, The National, Gulf News, The Week India, Wikipedia, and analysis from the Stimson Center, the Middle East Institute, and the International Crisis Group. It will be updated as the situation in Iran develops.

DISCLAIMER: This is a rapidly developing situation. While every effort has been made to verify facts at the time of publication (1 March 2026), some details may change as more information becomes available.

CLICK HERE FOR MORE BLOG POSTS